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DOES DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT POLICY AFFECT LABOR MARKET 
OUTCOMES IN CEE COUNTRIES? 
Dimitar EFTIMOSKI, PhD1 
Antonija JOSIFOVSKA, PhD2 
Dushko JOSHESKI, MSc3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 In this paper, in a sample of Central and Eastern European countries (Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine) we investigate the effects of: 1) 
democracy (measured by democracy indices); 2) government related variables and 3) 
other selected macroeconomic variables, on labor market outcomes. As labor market 
outcomes we use the following variables: unemployment rate, long-term 
unemployment rate, employment to population ratio, and average annual hours 
worked. As independent government related variables we use the following ones: 
government consumption (lagged), tax revenues as percentage of GDP (lagged), 
Herfindahl index of government (lagged). For the level of democracy we use following 
indices: Freedom house political rights and Civil liberties index (lagged), worker rights 
by CIRI human rights data project and Physical integrity rights index (lagged). Finally 
(regarding the independent macroeconomic variables), we estimate the effects of 
economic growth, inflation, and gross capital formation, on labor market outcomes. 
The empirical findings are based on two econometric techniques: The Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SUR), and the General Method of Moments (GMM). 
                                            
1 Full-time professor, University St. Kliment Ohridski – Bitola. Faculty of Law, Department of 
Economics, and the Integrated Business Faculty – Skopje (dimitar@ukim.edu.mk). 
2 Full-time professor, Integrated Business Faculty – Skopje (antonija.josifovska@fbe.edu.mk). 
3 Assistant, University Goce Delcev – Stip, Faculty of Tourism and Business Logistics. 
(dusko.josevski@ugd.edu.mk). 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 There is no doubt that the labor market efficiency depends both on the economic 
policy, as well as on the level of democracy practicing in certain society. The democracy 
can be defined as a model of political organization, where political power is more 
equally distributed. Though democracy has very attractive features, this model of 
political organization may lead to inefficient policies and high levels of income 
redistribution.4 
 Democracy and democratic labor market institutions and their influence on labor 
market outcomes had been subject of debate of the economists for the past two 
decades.5 As Barro6 noted, more democracy encourages rich to poor redistributions 
and may enhance the power of interest groups. In another paper, Barro7 once again 
concludes that the net effect of democracy on economic growth is inconclusive, which 
is supported by similar conclusion in the Gerring et al., paper.8  
 Labor economists and economists in general, by democracy on labor market 
usually mean political rights and civil liberties. Polity IV project by Marshal and Jeggers9 
data base is a reliable source for explaining democracy on labor market and worker 
rights. These set of rights, are mostly defined in labor and employment laws that 
                                            
4 Acemoglu, D. (2008), “Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies.” Journal of the European Economic 
Association, Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 1-44. 
5 Lehmann, H., Muravyev, A. (2009), “ How Important are Labour Market Institutions for Labour 
Market Performance in Transition Countries?” IZA DP No. 4673. 
6 Barro, R. (1999),“Determinants of Democracy.” Journal of Political Economy, 107(S6), pp. 158-183. 
7 Barro, R. (1996), “Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study.” NBER Working 
Paper, No.5698. 
8 Gerring, J., Bond, P., Barndt, W., Moreno, C. (2005), “Democracy and Growth: A Historical Perspective.” 
World Politics, 57 (3), pp. 323-64. 
9 Marshal,M., Jeggers, K. (2002),  Polity IV Project, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research 
(INSCR) Program Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). University 
of Maryland, College Park 20742. 
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express and constitute type of social contract.10 The social contracts define the 
obligations between workers and employees, and also represent some kind of 
mechanisms aimed for shearing the benefits and costs emanating from the economic 
activity.  
 In the period from 1960’s till the 1990’s, many European countries have enacted 
various job security provisions11, and in many of them the employer’s ability to 
terminate job contract at will is restricted. Lazear in his paper from 1990 finds evidence 
that increase in severance pay lowers the number of jobs in the economy. Also, as 
Blanchard and Wolfers12 note, about the institutions and labor markets, unemployment 
insurance has led to chronic unemployment. They state that the costs associated with 
the employment protection have “killed” the job creation.  
 In some studies, such as that of Nickel13, labor market dynamics is being 
attributed to the changes in institutions only (this conclusion is being drawn from the 
OECD countries). Bertola, Blauand and Kahn14, on the other hand, explained that 
macroeconomic and demographic shocks and changing labor market institutions have 
little to explain about the US unemployment, but much more to explain about the US 
relative unemployment. Some studies, as Blanchard and Gali15, connected 
unemployment, productivity shocks and the monetary policy. Their model proved that, 
under standard utility specification, productivity shocks do not affect unemployment.16 
 Recently, labor economists introduce the idea that individual policies interact 
systematically with the overall institutional framework. Recently, also, some studies 
                                            
10 Rittich, K. (2010),”Between Workers’ Rights and Flexibility: Labor Law in an Uncertain World.” Saint 
Louis University Law Journal, Vol. 54, p. 565. 
11 Lazear, E. P. (1990), “Job Security Provisions and Employment.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 105, no. 3, pp. 699-726. 
12 Blanchard, O., Wolfers, J. (2000),”The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European 
Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence.” Economic Journal, 110(462), pp. C1-33. 
13 Nickel, S. (1997), “Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 55-74. 
14 Bertola, G., Blau, F, Kahn, L. (2001), “Comparative Analysis of Labour-Market Outcomes: Lessons for 
the United States from International Long-Run Evidence.” NBER Working Paper No. 8526. 
15 Blanchard,O., Gali, J. (2007), “Labour Markets and Monetary Policy: A New-Keynesian Model with 
Unemployment.” NBER Working Paper No. 13897. 
16 It is through real wage setting and the labor market frictions, one way by which productivity shocks 
effects on unemployment, are determined. 
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have focused on the degree of competition on the product market and financial market 
development. In that context, the paper by Amable, Demmou and Gatti17, provide 
evidence on the linkages between large array of institutional arrangements on product, 
labor and financial markets.  
 Developing countries are interesting for investigation of the employment laws and 
regulatory reforms connected with the labor market.18 On the topic of regulation of 
labor market, Besley and Burges19 suggested that regulating in a pro-worker direction 
is associated with the increases in urban poverty. In the investigation of 85 countries 
worldwide, Botero et al.,20 found that richer countries regulate labor less than poor 
countries, although they have more generous security systems.21 In general, heavier 
labor regulation, according to the previous paper, is associated with larger unofficial 
economy and higher youth unemployment.  
 From the government related variables, the one that is most directly related as a 
proxy of government is Herfindahl index of government concentration22. Larger the 
number of parties in the coalition, lower the index. If it is one-party system this index 
would take value one, otherwise it would take value between 0 and 1.23 In his study, 
Wohlschlegel24 investigated the effect of corruption on unemployment. He concludes 
that voters in corrupt countries elect single strong party, because they expect single 
                                            
17 Amable B., L. Demmou and D. Gatti [2007] Employment Performance and Institutions: New Answers 
to an Old Question. IZA DP No. 2731. Discussion Paper Series, Bonn: IZA. 
18 Djankov, S., Ramalho, R. (2009), “Employment Laws in Developing Countries.” Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 37(1), pp. 3-13. 
19 Besley, T., Burgess, R. (2004), “Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from 
India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (1), pp. 91–134. 
20 Botero, J., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, L., Shleifer, A. (2004), “The Regulation of 
Labour.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (3), pp. 1339–1382. 
21 Left-wing governments are associated with more stringent labor regulations, and more generous 
security systems. 
22 This index is calculated as: 

n
i
isH
1
2  where 
is  
represents the number of the seats in parliament 
held by each party supporter of the government with respect to total seats in parliament. This index 
ranges 0 to 1.  
23 Longoni, E., Gregorini, F. (2009), Inequality, Political Systems and Public Spending. University of Milan 
– Bicocca. 
24 Wohlschlegel, A. (2012), “Government Concentration: Cause of or Remedy for Corruption?” 
(November 30, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183120 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2183120.  
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party government to be more successful in coping with such a corrupted environment. 
So, in a way, government concentration and corruption are positively associated. But, 
also, corruption increase unemployment, though this effect is weaker in countries with 
more concentrated governments. Thus, the effect of government concentration on 
unemployment is ambiguous.  
 Government size is usually measured by the government consumption, as 
percentage to GDP. Many research studies estimate the effect of government size on 
labor market outcomes, such as unemployment. For example, Feldmann’s25 study uses 
data from 1985 to 2002 for 19 industrialized countries and his main finding is that the 
large government sector is likely to increase unemployment. Karras26 in his study 
observed negative employment effects of government spending in eight countries, on 
a sample of 18 countries.  
 
Table 1.  Summarized Literature Review 
Study Used measures Econometric  technique Main findings 
 Acemoglu (2008) Protection of property rights.  
None, theoretical model  
and historical 
perspective.  
Oligarchic society may first become 
richer, but then fall behind similar 
democratic society. 
Amable, Demmou 
and Gatti (2007) 
Unemployment rate, inactivity 
rate, jobless rate.  
OLS, Fixed effect vector 
decomposition estimator, 
GLS, and panel corrected 
standard error estimator.  
Positive effect of employment 
protection on employment 
performance. 
Barro (1999) 
Democracy measured by a 
subjective indicator of electoral 
rights, political rights index and 
civil liberties index, gaps between 
female and male in years of 
education, urbanization rate, etc.  
Panel study of over 100 
countries from 1960-
1995. 
Democracy has little with the 
country size (measured by the log 
of population) but it has significant 
association with the income. 
Democracy rises with the middle 
class share of income. For a given 
standard of living, democracy fall 
with the urbanization. 
                                            
25 Feldmann, H. (2006), Government Size and Unemployment: Evidence from Industrial Countries. 
University of Bath. 
26 Karras, G. (1993), “Employment and Output Effects of Government Spending: Is Government Size 
Important?” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 354-369. 
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Blanchard and Gali 
(2007) 
Unemployment rate with the 
productivity shocks and 
introduction of real wage 
rigidities.  
None, theoretical new-
Keynesian model.  
Under standard utility specification, 
productivity shocks have no effect 
on unemployment, but once real 
wage rigidities are introduced 
inefficient unemployment arises. 
Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000) 
European unemployment 
interaction with the labor market 
institutions, as presented by: 
employment protection tax 
wedge, union density bargaining 
power, etc. 
Panel study for 20 OECD 
nations. Data cover 
period since 1960. 
Relationship between shocks and 
institutions are crucial in explaining 
unemployment.  
Djankov and 
Ramalho (2009) 
Labor regulation and labor 
market outcomes, also the 
interaction between labor market 
rigidities and labor market 
outcomes.  
Survey of the research 
of the effect of the 
employment laws in 
developing countries 
(using papers published 
since 2004). 
Developing countries with rigid 
employment laws tend to have 
larger informal sectors and higher 
unemployment, especially among 
young workers. 
 
Feldmann (2006) 
Government consumption and 
taxes, and their effect on 
unemployment rate. As 
government size related variables 
are taken: state owned 
enterprises, and transfers and 
subsidies. 
Generalized least 
squares estimate. This 
study uses data of 19 
industrialized countries.  
Large government sector is likely to 
increase unemployment.  
Gerring et al., (2005) 
Dependent variable in this study 
is economic growth and main 
emphasis has been out on the 
relationship between economic 
growth and the level of 
democracy. Democracy is being 
measured by the Polity IV score. 
Cross-country 
regression.  
Relationship between democracy 
(democracy level and stock)  and 
economic growth is thus robust and 
positive.  
Lehmann and 
Muravyev (2009) 
Labor market outcomes 
unemployment rate, long term 
unemployment rate and 
employment protection 
legislation along with the active 
labor market policies.  
Panel study with lagged 
regressors, in order 
endogeneity problem to 
be solved. 
Institutions matter for labor market 
outcomes, and that deregulation of 
market improves their 
performances. 
Nickell (1997) 
Unemployment rate, interaction 
with labor market institutions: 
employment protection, active 
labor market policies, union 
density, union coverage index.  
Panel random effect GLS 
for 20 OECD countries, 
for the period 1983-88 
and 1989-1994. 
European labor market is rigid and 
inflexible, so the result is high 
unemployment. North American 
labor market is dynamic and 
flexible, so the result is low 
unemployment. 
Wohlschlegel (2012) 
Corruption and government 
concentration with relation to 
unemployment rate.  
Causality analysis.  
Corruption increases 
unemployment. This effect is 
weaker in countries with more 
concentrated governments.  
 
2. DATA 
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 We use annual data for 12 countries from CEE group (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine) for the period 1993 - 2011. Data on labor market 
outcomes: unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate (unemployed for more 
than 12 months), average annual hours worked and employment to population ratio, 
are available from Penn World Tables. Also, from this table are gathered data on capital 
formation (physical capital). Data on government consumption, inflation and, taxes as 
percentage of GDP, are obtained from the World Bank. Data on Freedom House political 
rights and Freedom house civil liberties are obtained from the Pippa Noris shared data 
sets, from John F.Kennedy School of government at Harvard University. Herfindahl 
index of government concentration has been derived from data base on political 
institutions. Data on worker rights and Physical integrity rights index are provided from 
CIRI human rights data project by Cigranelli and Richards27. The descriptive statistics 
of the variables used in estimations is presented in Table 2: 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics and variables description 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Emplp Employment to 
population ratio 
50.31903 6.359795 32.4 62.7 N =     247 
Avh Average hours 
worked 
1857.352 151.7761 1593.38 2293.48 N =     228 
Ltur Long term 
unemployment 
5.41407 4.945736 0.9 30.2 N =     199 
Unem.rate Unemployment rate 11.20787 7.231255 3.9 37.3 N =     216 
Worker Workers’ rights 
(CIRI) 
0.866397 0.812982 0 2 N =     247 
Herfgov Herfindahl index of 
government 
concentration 
0.466005 0.376019 0 1 N =     247 
Physint Physical integrity 
rights index 
3.678862 2.990891 0 8 N =     246 
logRGDP Logarithm of real 
GDP 
9.049146 0.676928 7.290968 10.20836 N =     234 
Inflation Inflation (CPI) 48.07333 17.80478 6.74 91.2 N =     234 
Gov.cons Government 
consumption 
9.093803 2.46359 4.81 19.28 N =     234 
Tax revenues 
as 
Taxes (% of GDP) 16.84172 4.332618 5.96 26.87 N =     180 
                                            
27 Cingranelli, D., Richards, D. (2010), “The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data 
Project.” Human Rights Quarterly, 32 (2010), pp. 395–418. 
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percentage 
of GDP 
Gross capital 
formation 
Gross capital 
formation (wealth) 
2.28E+10 5.54E+10 1.62E+0
8 
4.64E+1
1 
N =     247 
FH_PR Freedom House 
political rights 
index 
3.919028 2.553796 1 7 N =     247 
FH_CL Freedom House 
civil liberties index 
2.894737 1.606976 1 7 N =     247 
 
3. METHODOLOGY OF THE APPLIED ECONOMETRICS WORK  
 Zellner28 proposed efficient method of estimation which is generalization of the 
linear regression model. Namely, Zellner proposed estimation technique that yields 
more efficient coefficient estimator than single equation least squares estimators, such 
as OLS. In this way coefficients are estimated simultaneously by applying generalized 
least squares to the whole system. In the algebraic form let first: 
 
         (1)  
 
 In matrix form previous expression can be written as: 
 
      (2) 
 
 In Zelner’s SUR models I > 1, i.e. number of dependent variables is greater than 
one, number of dependent variables that allow for different regressor matrices in each 
equation may differ i.e. . This method of estimation, also, accounts for 
contemporaneous correlation i.e. .29 The vector of all stacked 
independent variables is: ,  is the block diagonal matrix, 
 is the vector of stacked coefficient of all equations. Then, the OLS 
estimation of the system would be . The SUR model accounts for 
                                            
28 Zellner, A. (1962), “An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations and 
Tests for Aggregation Bias.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, No. 57, pp. 348–368. 
29 Hubert, M., Verdonck, T., Yorulmazb, O. (2014), “Fast Robust SUR With Applications to the Multivariate 
Chain Ladder Method.” preprint send to Elsevier.  
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interrelations between equations, assuming that error terms from the different 
equations are correlated, i.e. , where  is a weighting 
matrix based on a covariance matrix of the error terms. This covariance matrix is the 
expected value of the error terms of the nth observation in the ith equation. The 
covariance is . The elements of the covariance matrix can be calculated 
as:  . Now, we know that , where  and  is the Kronecker 
product actually block matrix30. In the second step generalized least squares regression 
is being run for the , so estimation is: 
  
    (3) 
 In a large sample, such as in this paper, this estimator is asymptotically efficient. 
The assumption of independence of the labor market outcomes is not really supported 
by the economic theory. That is why one can think that single equation OLS approach 
would be inefficient from a statistical point of view.31 Since some of the regressors 
appear to be endogenous, we use seemingly unrelated regressions with lagged 
regressors - to solve the endogeneity problem. Seemingly unrelated regressions 
technique implies that, in general equilibrium analysis, all variables are endogenous 
and only estimation that could be done is with exogenous/lagged values of endogenous 
variables i.e. reduced form of the equations.32  
 GMM dynamic panel data model, i.e. Arellano-Bond estimation33, has also been 
applied in order to account for the endogeneity problem. The first-order liner dynamic 
panel model can be expressed by the following regression: 
                                            
30 If matrix A is mΧn, and matrix B is pΧq matrix, then Kronecker product is: 
. 
31 Judge, G. G., Hill, R. C., Grifﬁths, W. E., Lutkepohl, H., Lee, T. C. (1988), Introduction to Theory and 
Practice of Econometrics. 2ed, Wiley New York 
32 Kennedy, P. (2003), A guide to Econometrics. MIT press, fifth edition. 
33 Arellano, M., Bond, S. (1991), “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence 
and an Application to Employment Equations.” Review of Economic Studies, 58, pp. 277-297. 
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)(xyy t,iit,it,iit   1      (4) 
 
where: )N,.....(i 1  is standing for a cross-section group, while )T,.....(t 1  for time 
period. The expression in parenthesis is composite error term that “covers” group-
specific random effect )( i  (that is time invariant) and the error term )( t,i that is 
assumed to be ),(IID
20  , and that varies over both groups and time. In order to solve 
the time invariant problem of the group-specific random effect )( i  - which biases 
estimation of )(  - the equation (4) is transformed into the following expression: 
)()xx()yy(yy t,it,it,it,it,it,it,it,i 11211       (5) 
 Due to the correlation problem between the lagged t,iy  and t,i , as well as the 
correlation problem inside the error term structure, the instrumental variables are 
applied. More precisely, for example, the lagged difference )yy( t,it,i 21    is substituted 
with )yy( t,it,i 32   34, or with the lagged level )y( t,i 2 .
35 The instrument should be highly 
correlated with )yy( t,it,i 21   , but not correlated with )( t,it,i 1  . Moreover, if )x( t,i  
are strictly exogenous, then   0 t,is,ixE   for each s  and t , so that T,i,i x........x 1  can be 
used as an instruments in eq.5. The Arellano – Bond estimation uses lagged levels as 
instruments.   
 
4. RESULTS  
 In this empirical section, we apply seemingly unrelated regressions technique 
(SUR), for panel data. Basically, one can use SUR when dealing with longitudinal panel 
data. This technique is being usually applied if there exist unequal variances in the 
                                            
34 Greene, W. (2002), Limdep Version 8.0: Econometric Modeling Guide. Vol.2, Plainview NY: 
Econometric Software, Inc. 
35 Arellano, M. (1989), “A Note on the Anderson-Hsiao Estimator for Panel Data.” Economics Letters, 31, 
pp. 337-41. 
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data, and more important - if the error terms amongst the equations are correlated. 
The SUR consists of equations explaining identical variables, but for different samples. 
Using SUR, when the equations are related only with their error terms, we achieve 
higher estimation efficiency. In fact, the SUR estimator is efficient under the 
assumptions we have made, because it is just a special case of the GLS estimator (if 
the error terms are uncorrelated across equations, the GLS and OLS estimators are 
numerically identical). We assume that the equations in our models are independent, 
but that correlation among the error terms of the equations exists, representing 
identical unsystematic influences. Furthermore, we use lagged regressors to account 
for the potential endogeneity. Finally, the GMM model, i.e. Arellano-Bond estimation, 
is being applied to account for endogeneity, but also to account for short and long run 
effects.  
 In the first model, as democracy indicator, Freedom house political rights measure 
has being used. The other variables include workers’ rights (Workerit), Herfindahl index 
of government (Herfgovit), Physical integrity rights index (Physintit) and inflation 
(Inflationit). Variable related with the economic activity is the logarithm of real GDP 
(logRGDPit), while the gross capital formation – as a proxy for wealth, and the tax 
revenues - as percentage of GDP (Tit), are included too. In the model 2, the only 
regressor that is different is the Freedom house civil liberties measure. In fact, we have 
introduced this measure instead of Freedom house political rights index in order to test 
the robustness of the impact of democracy on labor market outcomes, when the 
democracy measure is changed. In the model 3 government consumption, as a proxy 
for macroeconomic policy, has been introduced among the regressors. This model, 
also, includes Freedom house political rights index - as measure for democracy, and 
the other standard regressors from model 1 and model 2. Model 4 is GMM model, and 
it is Arellano-Bond estimation, where among the regressors are included: worker’s 
rights measure, Herfindahl index of government concentration, Physical integrity rights 
index, Freedom house civil liberties index and government consumption, and other 
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standard regressors from the first three models. The results from the different models 
are presented in the appendix (Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6). 
 In the model 1, Freedom house political rights index, as measure of democracy, 
is positively associated with employment to population ratio, but negatively associated 
with the long-term unemployment rate and general unemployment rate. These results 
are a priori expected, since it is acceptable that higher level of democracy increases 
employment and the number of annual hours worked, and thus reduce the long-term 
unemployment and unemployment in general. Logarithm of real GDP is positively 
associated with the employment to population ratio and also positively associated with 
the long-term unemployment rate and general unemployment rate (with rise of 
productivity, fewer workers will be needed to produce the same amount of output). So, 
in the short run, incremental increase in productivity, causes rise of unemployment, 
but in the long run unemployment effect disappears.36  
 In the model 2, one can see that democracy index is significant only in the first 
equation. Otherwise, freedom house civil liberties do not enter significantly in either 
equation. Worker rights do significantly influence average annual hours worked and 
employment to population ratio, while they enter negatively when in association with 
long-term unemployment and unemployment rate. 
 In the model 3, workers rights have significant positive effect on the average 
annual hours worked, and they enter negatively and significantly with the 
unemployment rate. Government consumption seems to have negative effect on 
employment to population ratio and on average annual hours worked, while the effect 
is positive on long-term unemployment and unemployment rate. Hence, fiscal prudence 
is needed in these countries. Tax revenues, as expected, affect negatively on average 
annual hours worked and employment to population ratio. Democracy affects 
employment positively and significantly, and has negative impact on unemployment 
related variables. 
                                            
36 Blanchard,O., Solow, R., Wilson, B.A. (2007), Productivity and Unemployment. MIT Economics. 
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 Finally, with the model 4 the short and the long-term effects on labor market 
variables are captured. The results suggest that the Freedom house civil liberties, on a 
short run, decrease employment to population ratio, but on a long run increases long-
term unemployment, in the dynamical framework. Physical integrity rights index 
reduces long-term unemployment rate on a long run.  
5. CONCLUSION   
 Regression results prove that increase in the worker rights index will induce on 
average higher employment to population ratio, and will increase annual hours worked. 
Also higher lagged worker rights will reduce long-term unemployment and general 
unemployment rate. Democracy indices, on average, increase employment to 
population ratio and average annual hours worked, and reduce long-term 
unemployment rate and general unemployment rate. However, these results are 
conditional upon the analysis on a short and on a long run, i.e. the Arellano-Bond 
estimation. When analyzed in terms of time effect, on a long run, Freedom house civil 
liberties index reduces employment to population ratio and increases long-term 
unemployment rate, while, on a short run, this index significantly increases the general 
unemployment rate.  
 Herfindahl index of government concentration, on average, it does significantly 
increase long-term unemployment rate and general unemployment rate. On a long run, 
this index increases long-term and general unemployment rate. It satisfies our 
expectations that smaller democracy levels (higher government concentration, which 
means higher Herfidahl indices) result in higher unemployment rates. The same can be 
concluded for the Physical integrity rights index. On average, it does positively and 
significantly affect the long-term unemployment rate and general unemployment rate. 
On a long run, higher Physical integrity rights index, on average, reduces long term 
unemployment rate, whereas on a short run, it generally reduces the unemployment 
rate. The higher government respect for disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political 
imprisonment, and torture (higher democracy level), the smaller unemployment rates.     
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 Government consumption, as percentage of GDP, affects positively both, the 
employment to population ratio and unemployment rate, though, on a long run, 
government consumption reduces employment to population ratio, and, on average, it 
increases the long-term unemployment rate. The previous is in line with our 
expectations, as well as with the economic theory. One has to have in mind that 
observed CEE countries in their transition period were predetermined to conduct 
expansive fiscal policy, especially in the segment of government consumption. The 
reasons were different - from the European Union integration processes and the need 
for infrastructural improvements (intensive capital investments) to anti-cyclical and 
social policy corrections. Therefore, taking into account the crowding-out effect of fiscal 
policy – which implies that fiscal policy, on a long run, leads to extinction of the private 
sector – the reduction of employment and increase of the rate of unemployment, on a 
long run, were inevitable. So, in general, government consumption, on average, 
reduces positive labor market outcomes (employment to population ratio and average 
annual hours worked), and increases long-term unemployment rate and general 
unemployment rate.  
 The effects of the other macroeconomic variables on labor market outcomes, are 
not quite clear. We believe that it is due to the specific macroeconomic policies in 
different CEE countries. This statement is valid for both, EU and non-EU countries. 
Moreover, different macroeconomic policies were conducted in all EU member 
countries, implied in our sample, before their accession. We have tried to solve this 
problem by using GMM model, where the specific effects of different macroeconomic 
policies among countries would have been neutralized, but the results were partially 
successful.       
 Finally, one can conclude that higher level of democracy induces more positive 
labor market outcomes. The main conclusion from this paper, which at the same time 
can be understood as a recommendation for policy makers in observed CEE countries, 
is that employers have to be influenced to improve the worker rights in their respective 
countries. Our investigation confirms that higher worker rights have positive impact on 
DOES DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT POLICY AFFECT LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES IN 
CEE COUNTRIES? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
19 
 
the rate of unemployment. Improving workers rights can be done through various 
mechanisms i.e. imposing minimum wage on a higher level, as percentage from the 
average pay in the country or industry, or through higher workers participation which 
is regulated with the European worker’s council directive. Regarding macroeconomic 
policies, taking into account the existence of the crowding-out effect, we strongly 
believe that fiscal prudence is needed.     
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Appendix 
 
Table 3.  Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) in panel data set (model 1) 
Model   1 2 3 4 
Dependent 
variable  
 emplp 
(Employment to 
population ratio) 
lavh log of (average 
hours worked) 
Ltur (long term 
unemployment) 
Unem.rate 
(Unemployment 
rate) 
  
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
L_Worker  
Lagged Workers’ rights 
(CIRI) 
-0.100 0.058*** -0.80*** -1.49 
L_Hergov 
Lagged Herfindahl index 
of government 
concentration  
-0.696* -0.018* 0.76* 1.03* 
L_Physint 
Lagged Physical integrity 
rights index 
-0.456*** -0.007** 0.42*** 0.60*** 
L_FH_PR  
Lagged Freedom House 
political rights index 
0.313*** 0.003* -0.28*** -0.41**** 
L_Inflation Lagged Inflation (CPI) 
-0.074*** 0.001* -0.02* -0.04* 
L_logRGDP  
Lagged  Logarithm of 
real GDP  
3.686*** -0.058*** 1.34*** 1.67*** 
L_Gross 
capital 
formation  
Lagged  Gross capital 
formation (wealth) 
2.06E-11*** 4.53E-13*** -9.73E-12*** -9.84E-12*** 
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L_Tax 
revenues as 
percentage of 
GDP 
Lagged  Taxes (%of 
income) 
-0.550*** -0.004*** -0.05 -0.07 
C Constant  
30.299*** 8.050*** -5.99 -2.99 
R2  0.5887 0.4470 0.2281 0.2187 
Note: *** statistical significance at all levels of significance;** at 5%,*at 10%.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) in panel data set (model 2) 
Model   1 2 3 4 
Dependent 
variable  
 Emplp 
(Employment to 
population ratio) 
lavh log of (average 
hours worked) 
Ltur (long term 
unemployment) 
Unem. rate 
(Unemployment 
rate) 
  
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
L_Worker  
Lagged Workers’ 
rights (CIRI) 
0.35 0.060*** -1.02*** -1.79*** 
L_Hergov 
Lagged Herfindahl 
index of government 
concentration  
-0.50 -0.014 0.37 0.43 
L_Physint 
Lagged Physical 
integrity rights index 
-0.50*** -0.006*** 0.38*** 0.53*** 
L_FH_CL 
Lagged Freedom 
House civil liberties 
index 
0.38*** -0.002*** 0.01 0.09 
L_Inflation 
Lagged Inflation 
(CPI) 
-0.08*** 0.001* -0.02* -0.03* 
L_logRGDP  
Lagged  Logarithm 
of real GDP  
4.57*** -0.052*** 0.69 0.75 
L_Gross capital 
formation  
Lagged  Gross 
capital formation 
(wealth) 
1.81E-11*** 4.61E-13*** -9.67E-12*** -1.02E-11*** 
L_Tax revenues 
as percentage of 
GDP 
Lagged  Taxes  
(%of income) 
-0.546*** -0.004*** -0.04 -0.056 
C Constant  
22.272*** 8.011*** -0.88 4.013 
R2  0.5806 0.4420 0.1569 0.1431 
Note: *** statistical significance at all levels of significance;** at 5%,*at 10%.  
Table 5. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) in panel data set (model 3) 
Model   1 2 3 4 
Dependent 
variable  
 Emplp 
(Employment to 
population ratio) 
lavh log of 
(average hours 
worked) 
Ltur (long term 
unemployment) 
Unem.rate 
(Unemployment 
rate) 
  
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
L_Worker  
Lagged Workers’ 
rights (CIRI) 
-0.10 0.052*** -0.35 -0.89*** 
L_Hergov 
Lagged Herfindahl 
index of government 
concentration  
0.26 
-0.007 -0.24 -0.23 
L_Physint 
Lagged Physical 
integrity rights index 
-0.44*** -0.004* 0.27*** 0.39*** 
L_FH_PR  
Lagged Freedom 
House political rights 
index 
0.26*** 
0.001 -0.18*** -0.27*** 
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L_Gov.consump Lagged Government 
consumption  
-0.32*** -0.006*** 0.52*** 0.67*** 
L_logRGDP  
Lagged  Logarithm 
of real GDP  
2.33*** -0.041*** 0.61*** 0.53 
L_Gross capital 
formation  
Lagged  Gross 
capital formation 
(wealth) 
1.94E-11*** 
4.23E-13*** -7.43E-12*** -6.84E-12* 
L_Tax revenues as 
percentage of GDP 
Lagged  Taxes 
 (%of income) 
-0.56*** -0.004*** -0.06* -0.08* 
C Constant  
41.60*** 7.978*** -4.40* 0.34 
R2  0.5799 0.4749 0.4683 0.4200 
Note: *** statistical significance at all levels of significance;** at 5%,*at 10%. 
Table 6. GMM  regressions (model 4) 
Model   1 2 3 4 
Dependent 
variable  
 
Emplp (Employment 
to population ratio) 
Avh (average 
hours worked) 
Ltur (long term 
unemployment) 
Unem.rate 
(Unemployment 
rate) 
  
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Dependent 
variables Lag(1)  0.87*** 0.76 0.82*** 0.96*** 
Lag(2) 
 
-0.01 -0.17*** -0.20*** -0.39*** 
Worker Workers’ rights (CIRI)  6.69 0.04 -0.02 
Lag(1)  
-0.39 -0.31 0.39*** 0.26 
Hergov 
Herfindahl index of 
government 
concentration 
-0.10 -11.47 0.67*** 0.93*** 
Lag(1)  
0.34 -12.70 0.04 0.49 
Physint Physical integrity 
rights index index 
0.06 0.56 -0.18*** -0.13 
Lag(1)  
-0.01 2.32 -0.09* -0.18** 
FH_CL 
Freedom House civil 
liberties index 
-0.14*** -0.38 0.10* -0.06 
Lag(1)  
-0.09 1.56 0.05 0.19*** 
Gov.cons 
Government 
consumption 
-0.33* -8.10** 0.41*** 0.096 
Lag(1)  
0.61*** 2.18 -0.13 0.252 
logRGDP Logarithm of real GDP 
7.68*** 22.88 -9.40*** -14.2*** 
Lag(1)  
-6.09** -99.68** 8.62*** 12.8*** 
Gross capital 
formation 
Gross capital 
formation (wealth) 
-3.76E-12 -2.17E-10* 2.41E-12 -4.39E-12 
Lag(1)  
4.41E-12 1.47E-10 -3.50E-12 2.21E-12 
Tax revenues as 
percentage of 
GDP 
Taxes (% of GDP) 
0.040 1.64 -0.09 -0.25*** 
Lag(1)  
-0.075 -1.19 -0.04 0.11 
Constant Constant 
-9.141 1690.427*** 9.20 16.87 
Sargan test  H0: 
over identifying 
restrictions are 
valid ;p-value 
 0.5944 0.0000 0.6249 0.6249 
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Note: *** statistical significance at all levels of significance;**at 5%,*at 10%.
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